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This paper illustrates a particular limited information strategy for assessing the empirical
plausibility of alternative quantitative general equilibrium business cycle models. The basic
strategy is to test whether a model economy can account for the response of the actual
economy to an exogenous shock. To be useful, this strategy requires that we know how
the actual economy responds to the shock in question and that different models generate
different predictions for that response. Here we concentrate on the response of aggregate
hours worked and real wages to a fiscal policy shock.' The fiscal policy shock is identified
with the dynamic response of government purchases and average marginal income tax rates
to an exogenous increase in military purchases.
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) (BEF) show that standard Real Business Cycle
(RBC) models can account for the salient features of how hours worked and after -taxreal
wages respond to a fiscal policy shock, but only if it is assumed that marginal tax rates are
constant. When this counterfactual assumption is abandoned, RBC models cannot account
for the response of the economy to a fiscal policy shock. For example, high labor supply
elasticity versions of these models counterfactually predict that after a fiscal policy shock,
government purchases are negatively correlated with hours worked. In reality, after a fiscal
policy shock, government purchases and hours worked are strongly positively correlated. Low
labor supply elasticity versions of these models greatly understate the conditional volatility
1See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) for a similar approach to evaluating alternative models
of the monetary transmission mechanism.of hours worked. So regardless of what is assumed about the elasticity of labor supply, the
model cannot account for the facts. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) show that various two sector
versions of the RBC model generate predictions for aggregate hours worked and realwages
that are very similar to those of the one sector model. So presumably these models too
would fail our diagnostic test. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Devereux, Head and
Lapham (1996) study the effects of changes in government purchases in stochastic general
equilibrium models which incorporate increasing returns and oligopolistic pricing. Since their
models imply that a positive shock to government purchases raises realwages, they would
fail our test.
In this paper, we examine a variant of Alexopoulos' (1998) model of efficiencywages. We
find that, like the other models discussed above, the efficiencywage model cannot account
for the quantitative responses of hours worked and of realwages to a fiscal policy shock. In
particular it shares the strengths and weaknesses of high labor supply elasticity RBC models.
So the model can account for the conditional volatility of realwages and hours worked. But
it cannot account for the temporal pattern of how these variables respond to a fiscalpolicy
shock and generates a counterfactual negative conditional correlation betweengovernment
purchases and hours worked. Integrating over the results we have obtained with the different
models, we conclude there is a puzzle. Measurement is ahead of theory.
To identify exogenouschangesto government purchases and tax rates we build on the
approach used by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) who focus on exogenous movements in defense
spending. To isolate such movements, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) identify three political
events that led to large military buildups which were arguably unrelated to developments
in the domestic U.S. economy. We refer to these events as 'Ramey-Shapiro episodes'. Con-
trolling for other shocks, we explore how the U.S. economy behaved after the onset of the
Ramey-Shapiro episodes and use the results in two ways. First, we use it to construct the
basic experiment that is conducted in the model. Specifically we confrontagents in the
model with a sequence of changes in total government purchases and marginal income tax
rates that coincides with the estimated dynamic response of those variables to a Ramey
and Shapiro episode. Second, we use the estimated dynamicresponse paths of aggregate
hours worked and after -taxreal wages as the standard against which we assess our model's
performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizesour evidence
regarding the dynamic effects of a fiscal shock. Section 3 discusses our procedure for results
to assess the empirical plausibility of competing business cycle models. Section 4presents
a version of Alexopoulos' (1998) efficiency wage model, modified to allow for fiscal shocks.
Section 5 assesses the quantitative properties of the model. Finally, Section 6 contains
2concluding remarks.
2. Evidence on the Effects of a Shock to Fiscal Policy
In this section we accomplish two tasks. First, we describe our strategy for estimating the
effects of an exogenous shock to fiscal policy. Second, we present the results of implementing
this strategy.2
2.1. Identifying the Effects of A Fiscal Policy Shock
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use a 'narrative approach' to isolate three arguably exogenous
events that led to large military buildups and total government purchases: the beginning
of the Korean War (1950:3), the beginning of major U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War
(1965:1) and the beginning of the Carter-Reagan defense buildup (1980:1).
To estimate the exogenous movements in government purchases, G, and average mar-
ginal tax rates, ,inducedby the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode and the corresponding
movements in other variables, we use the following procedure. Define the set of dummy
variables D, where D =1if t ={1950:3,1965:1, 1980:1} and zero otherwise. We include
D as an explanatory variable in a vector autoregression (VAR). Suppose that the k x 1
vector stochastic process Z has the representation:
=Ao+ A1(L)Z_1 + A2(L)D + 'Ut, (2.1)
where A1 (L) and A2 (L) are finite ordered matrix polynomials in nonnegative powers of the
lag operator, Eut =0,
/ 0fora1ls0 Euut_8 for s =0,
andis a positive definite k x k matrix. The A can be consistently estimated using least
squares. The response of Zt+k, the jth element of Zt+k, to the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro
episode at date t, is given by the coefficient on L' in the expansion of [I —A1(L)L]'A2(L).
Note that this procedure assumes that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are of equal intensity.3
2.2. Empirical Results
In this subsection we present the results of implementing the procedure discussed above.
Unless otherwise noted, the vector Z contains the log level of time t real GDP, the three
2Thjs section is a condensed version of a similar section in BEF.
3BEF modify this procedure to allow the different episodes to have different intensities. They show that
the qualitative nature of the estimated impulse response functions does not depend on whether one imposes
the equal intensity assumption or not.
3month Treasury bill rate, the log of the producer price index of crude fuel, the log level of a
measure of the average marginal income tax rate, the log level of real government purchases
and either the log level of real wages or the log of aggregate hours worked.4 Our measure of
the tax rate, taken from Stephenson (1998), is an updated version of theaverage marginal
statutory tax rate constructed by Barro and Sahasakul (1983). It is a weighted average
of statutory marginal tax rates, where the weights are the shares of adjustedgross income
subject to each statutory rate.5 In all cases we included six lagged values of all variables in
the VAR. All estimates are based on quarterly data from 1947:1 to 1994:4.
Figure 1 reports the responses of real government purchases and the tax rate to the onset
of a Ramey-Shapiro episode. The solid lines display point estimates of the coefficients of the
dynamic response functions.6 The dashed lines are sixty-eight percent confidence intervals.7
Consistent with results in Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(1999), the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode leads to a large, persistent, hump-shaped rise
in government purchases, with a peak response of 13 percent roughly 6 quarters after the
shock. In addition, the tax rate rises in a hump-shaped pattern, mirroring the hump-shaped
dynamic response function of government purchases, The peak response of 2.3 percentage
points occurs roughly 7 quarters after the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode. This represents
a rise of roughly 13 percent in the tax rate relative to its value in 1949.
Figure 1 also displays the responses of aggregate hours worked in the private sector and
the after -taxreal wage in the manufacturing sector to the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode.
Two key results emerge here. First, hours worked has a delayed, hump-shapedresponse with
a peak response of over 2 percent occurring roughly 6 periods after the fiscal shock. Second,
the after-tax real wage falls after the fiscal policy shock.8
3. A Limited Information Diagnostic Procedure
The previous section displayed our estimates of the dynamicconsequences of a fiscal policy
shock to government purchases, average marginal tax rates, hours worked and realwages.
4An appendix available from us describes the data in more detail.
5See Stephenson (1998) for refinements to the Barro-Sahasakul measure. We found that our resultswere
insensitive to ignoring these refinements, and to using another tax rate measure suggested by Seater (1985).
6The impulse response function of the tax rate is reported in percentage points. The other impulse
response functions are reported in percentage deviations from each variable's unshocked path.
7See BEF for details of the construction of these confidence bands. These confidence bands assume that
the dates marking the onset of the Ramey Shapiro episodes are known with certainty. We have conducted
experiments to quantify the importance of "date uncertainty". Specifically we take into account the possi-
bility that the exact Ramey-Shapiro dates might be off by up to 3 quarters each. We find our results to be
robust to these experiments.
8J BEF we find qualitatively similar results for other measures of hours worked and realwages.
4In this section we provide a short discussion, taken from BEF, ofa limited information
procedure for using these results to assess the empirical plausibility of competing models.
We partition Z as
where F =( CTt )' and Zisa (k —2)x 1 vector of the other variables. For the class of
models that we consider the equilibrium law of motion for Z takes the form of asystem of
linear difference equations:
B0Z =K+ B1(L)Z_1 + B2(L)D + Et. (3.1)
Here B1(L) is a finite-ordered matrix polynomial in the lag operator, B2(L)[O_ M(L)'J',
°k—2is a k —2vector of zeroes, and the elements of( -, )'are uncorrelated with
each other, with D and with lagged values of Z. The last two rows of (3.1)are the policy
rule for the fiscal variables, F. With this specification the only variables thatare directly
affected by D are those in F. The onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode (D =1),sets off a
chain of exogenous movements in F which leads to movements in Z through the mechanisms
embedded in the particular model under consideration.
Our theoretical model, (3.1), and a VAR of the form (2.1) are equivalent when
A0 =B1k,A1(L) =B'B1(L),A2(L) =B1B2(L),Ut =B'E. (3.2)
To characterize impulse response functions we use the movingaverage representation
(MAR) corresponding to (3.1) given by
=H0+ H(L) + H(L)D. (3.3)
By assumption, {H} and {Hj form square summable sequences. Note that H(L) completely
characterizes the dynamic response path of the vector Z to the time t realization ofD. In
particular, the response of Z3 is given by the coefficient on P in H(L).
It is useful to write the last two rows of (3.3) as
F =H+ H2(L)E + H2(L)D (3.4)
We do not identify the elements of t in our empirical analysis. However, underour assump-
tions, D is orthogonal to .Sowe can study the effects of a change in D abstracting from
movements in t. This is equivalent to working with theexogenous variable policy rule
F =H+ H2(L)D. (3.5)
To assess the empirical plausibility of a model's implications foran exogenous shock to
fiscal policy we can proceed as follows.
51. Estimate the VAR given by (2.1) using U.S. data. Thisyields estimates A0, A,(L) and
A2(L).
2. Use the estimates A0, A, (L) and A2(L) to obtaina moving average representation for
Z that is equivalent to (3.3):
=[i
—A,(1)]'A0 + [i —A1(L)L]'A2(L)D+ V— Ai(L)L]'u,
'dO + Hd(L)Dt + Hd(L)Ut.
Notice that H(L), the first (k —2)x 1 sub-block of Hd(L), characterizes the dynamic
responses of the non-fiscal variables, Z,tothe onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode.
3. Use H(L), the last 2 x 1 sub-block of Hd(L), to characterize theexogenous variable
fiscal policy rule in the theoretical model given by (3.5).
4. Using this rule, and calibrating the remaining modelparameters, study the theoret-
ical model's implications for the dynamicresponses of the non-fiscal variables to the
onset of the Ramey-Shapiro episode. Denote the polynomial in thelag operator that
characterizes these responses as H, (L).
5. Compare these responses, obtained using the theoreticalmodel, to their empirical
counterparts, estimated in the second step. Abstracting from sampling uncertainty
and the linearity assumptions implicit in the VAR analysis, the twosets of response
functions should be the same, i.e. it should be the case thatH(L)
Results in Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) suggest thatuncertainty about the structural
parameters of the model describing preferences and technology are unlikely tosignificantly
affect inference for the models we consider. Hence,we ignore this source of uncertainty. We
do take into account sampling uncertainty pertaining to the estimatedresponse of the U.S.
economy to a fiscal policy shock. Sampling uncertainty about the A from our VAR generates
uncertainty about our data-based estimates of the impulse responses H' (L) denoted H(L)
and our data-based estimates of H2 (L) denoted H (L). In additionsampling uncertainty in
H (L) feeds into uncertainty about our model-based estimates of H'(L), denoted H (L).
BEF show how to account for these sources ofsampling uncertainty when assessing the
ability of the model to account for various conditional moments of thedata, i.e. moments
9As discussed in BEF the previous conclusion dependson the following simplification regarding agents'
views about the law of motion for Dt: agents expect D =Ufor all t. In addition, a realization of D =1
does not affect agents' future expectations of D, i.e. they continue toexpect that future values of D will
equal zero. So from their perspective, a realization of D =1is just like the realization of an iid exogenous
shock to F. But once such a shock occurs, the expectedresponse of Ft+ is given by the coefficient on
in the polynomial H2(L).
6pertaining to the behavior of the economy conditional on a fiscal shock having occurred. One
way to estimate such a moment is to use a point estimate, °H, of the vector of coefficients,
8H, characterizing H(L), in a way that does not involve the use of an economic model.
We let d(OH) denote the point estimate of a conditional moment obtained in this way. A
different way to estimate the conditional moment is to use an economic model along with
values for the parameters describing agents' preferences and technology and an estimate
of the coefficients characterizing the exogenous variable policy rule, 9. Note that 9 is a
subset of 9H• We denote by m() the point estimate of the conditional moment in question
derived from the economic model.
Let
S(OH) =d(OH)-m(O).
We are interested in testing hypothesis of the form:
H0 : S(OH) =0.
An implication of results in Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) and Newey and West
(1987) is that the test statistic
J =S(9)'var[S(H)]' SCH) (3.6)
is asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of freedom, where
[s()] is a consistent estimator of var [S(H)] 10Belowwe use this test statistic to
formally assess the ability of an efficiency wage model to account for various conditional
moments of the data.
4. A General Equilibrium Efficiency Wage Model
In this section we describe a version of Alexopoulos' (1998) efficiency wage model, modified
to allow for distortionary income taxes. The basic structure of the model is similar to a
standard RBC model with the exception of the labor market. In contrast to RBC models,
we assume that a worker's effort is imperfectly observable by firms. Competitive firms offer
'°To generate an estimate of var we use the same bootstrap procedure employed to compute
confidence intervals for the impulse response functions estimated in the data. Specifically, let 9Hj be the
point estimate of the moving average coefficients of Z implied by the VAR coefficients generated by the ith
bootstrap draw, i =1,...,N,where N =500.Then
[s()] =N1(s(OH)-
where(OHj) =(1/N)>s(OH),is a consistent estimate of var [s(H)].
7contracts that induce workers not to shirk on the job. These contracts specify a realwage,
an effort level, and a specification that a worker will be dismissed and paid only a fraction of
the wage if he is caught shirking on the job. Given a no bonding constraint, the supply for
labor will in general exceed the demand for labor, resulting in unemployment. Whether the
ex-post utility of employed workers exceeds the utility of unemployed individuals depends on
the nature of risk sharing among members of the household. In the version of Alexopoulos'
model discussed below, risk sharing is imperfect (by assumption) and unemployed workers
are worse off, ex-post, than employed workers."
4.1. The Government
The government faces the flow budget constraint
t (r
—6)K + tWtnth + ,
whereG, is real government purchases, tisthe marginal tax rate, rt is the rental rate of
capital, 0 < 6 < 1 is the depreciation rate, W is the real wage rate, tisemployment, and
I is lump-sum taxes. By assumption h, hours worked per worker, is constant so that hours
and employment move in proportion to one another. The fiscal policy rule is of the form
given by the last two rows of (3.1).
4.2. Households
The representative household owns the stock of capital, makes all capital related decisions,
and pays both capital income taxes and lump-sum taxes. The household consists of a unit
measure continuum of individuals. If individuals earn labor income, they must pay taxes on
it. Employed members of the household partly insure the income of unemployed members
of the household.
The household accumulates capital according to
K+1 =(1
—6)K+ It, (4.1)
where K is the beginning of period t capital stock and It is time t investment. The household
rents capital to firms at the competitively determined rate Vt,andrental income, net of
depreciation, is taxed at the margin. The household uses its rental income net of these taxes
and any lump-sum taxes that it pays to buy new capital. It distributesany remaining funds
equally among the individual members of the household. We denote this common income as
C =(1
—) (Vt — 6)K —— (K+,—Kg). (4.2)
11Alexopolous (1998) shows that in her model, with complete risk sharing, unemployed workers are ex
post better off than employed workers. This version of her model is observationally equivalent to Hansen's
(1985) RBC model with indivisible labor supply. See Woodford (1994) for a similar argument.
8Members of the household derive their remaining income from selling labor services to
firms or from partial unemployment insurance provided by the household.12 They are as-
sumed to take both the terms of labor contracts and firms' demand for labor parametrically.
In addition, from the perspective of firms, all individuals look alike. So we can think of the
employment outcome for any individual as being determined completely randomly. Some
individuals will be employed, while others will be unemployed. Under our assumptions, no
individual would choose to be unemployed, because the ex-post utility of such an individual
will be less than or equal to that of an employed individual.
Employed workers will either work and exert the level of effort required by the labor
contract, denoted et, or they will shirk. The labor contract stipulates that if a worker is
caught shirking, they will be fired and receive only a fraction s of their wages. The technology
for detecting shirkers is imperfect, so that a shirker is only caught with probability d.
The household only observes the initial employment status of its members, not whether
they shirked or were fired. Each employed member of the household transfers Wt units
of income to a pool which is distributed equally among the unemployed members of the
household. By assumption, the household chooses the level of the transfer so that unemployed
members of the household will be at least as well off as any shirker caught by the firm would
be.'3 Finally, we assume that labor income is taxed. Members of the household whopay the
insurance transfer receive no tax credit for it, while recipients of transfers do notpay taxes
on that type of income.
Our assumptions imply that the consumption of an employed individual who does not
shirk is constrained by
(4.3)
An employed individual who shirks but does not get caught faces the same constraint. An
employed individual who shirks and is caught only receives the fraction s of his contractual
wages. Hence, his consumption, C, is constrained by
(4.4)
Suppose that tmembersof the household are employed while 1—nt are unemployed. This
implies that the transfer received by each member of the unemployed is given by ntlIit/(1_mt).
Hence, the consumption of an unemployed individual, C, is constrained by
c <ci" +1 (4.5)
12J is straightforward to reformulate the model so that a self financing unemployment insuranceprogram
is provided by the government rather than the household.
"Alexopoulos (1998) also considers the case in which there is perfect insurance across members of the
family.
9The instantaneous utility of an individual withconsumption level C, and a positive level
of effort e, is given by
log(C) + log(T —— he)
while the instantaneous utility of an individual withconsumption level C who exerts no work
effort is given by
log(C) +1n(T),
where ij >0,T is the time endowment, and is the fixed cost ofexerting nonzero effort.
Thus, an employed worker who does not shirk has utility
log(Ct) + 1n(T —— he)
where et is determined by the contract offered by the firm.
An employed worker who shirks but is not caught hasutility
log(Ct) +riln(T)
while a shirker who is caught has utility
log(Cfl + ijln(T).
Finally, an unemployed individual has utility
log(Cfl + i1n(T).
Let n be the number of shirkers and let d be the probability ofa shirker being caught.
Since there is a continuum of individuals, this implies thatdri is the number of shirkers
caught and (1 —d)n the number of shirkers not caught.
Notice that the effective leisure time of caught shirkers andunemployed individuals is
the same. If the family sets the transfer so that theirconsumption and utility levels are the
same this will imply that
=(1
—t)(1 —t)sWth. (4.6)
The household takes the effort level andwage rate as given in the contracts offered by
the firm. The household also takes firms' labor demandas given. The only decisions the
household makes are those regarding capital and the level ofcommon income, in order to
maximize the expected utility of an individual household member:
max E0 — nfl {log(C)+ log(T —— het)]+ {Ct,Kt+i}0
n [(1 —d)log(C) + dlog(C;) + log(T)] +
(1- flt) [log(Cfl + 1n(T)]}.
subject to (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6).
104.3. The Firm
A perfectly competitive firm produces output using the technology
=K(nthetXt)'
where tisthe number of workers it hires. It maximizes its profits
max K (nthetXt)' —Wnh—rtKt
T47,t ,Kt ,et
subjectto the no shirking' condition:
log(Ct) + log(T —— het)￿ (1 —d)log(Ct) + dlog(Cfl + 1n(T). (4.7)
According to (4.7) the expected utility of an employee who does not shirk is at least as great
as the expected utility of an employee who shirks. Here we assume that all employed workers
are monitored and the exogenous probability of being caught shirking is d. In equilibrium
there is no shirking. Given a wage rate, W, we can think of (4.7) as indicating a maximal
level of effort the firm will be able to extract from workers. Rearranging the constraint we
see that
et<e(Wt)=T_().
The firm takes the level of the intra-household transfer W parametrically. This is what
allows us to write the expression on the right-hand side as a function, from the firm's point
of view, only of its choice regarding W.
Alexopoulos (1998) shows that the first-order conditions for the firm, along with the
expression for e(Wt) imply that Ce/C is a constant given by X where xsatisfies
Td(1 —sX)(X — 1)=(1
—s)[(T —)xd/ — TX]. (4.8)
This is a nonlinear equation in X that can be solved numerically.
The level of employment, nt, which characterizes the solution to the firm's problem
will not in general coincide with the number of workers who wish to work at the contract
characterized by (Wt, e(wt)). As long as the demand for workers is less than the supply of
workers, (4.7) will hold with equality and there will be equilibrium unemployment. We
confine ourselves to calibrated versions of the model in which this is the case and in which
all of the inequality constraints above hold with equality.
We use the log linearization procedure described by Christiano (1998) to solve for the
competitive equilibrium of this economy.
115. Quantitative Properties of the Model
This sections assesses the quantitative properties of our model. We proceed in threesteps.
First, we discuss how we calibrate the model's parameters. Second, we discuss how the model
responds over time to a fiscal shock. Third, we formally assess the ability of the model to
account for various conditional moments of the data.
5.1. Model Calibration
Alexopoulos (1998) estimates and analyzes the lump-sum version of the model above using
the Generalized Method of Moments procedures discussed in Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992). Here we simply calibrate the model by choosing parameters to match a number
of features in postwar US data. We assume that the time endowment is T 1369 which
corresponds to a quarter consisting of 15 hours per day. We assume that the fixed cost
of providing nonzero effort is given by =16.We parameterize xtoimply that being
unemployed lowers a worker's consumption by about 22 percent (see Gruber 1997). This
requires x= 1.285.We set i =1.03-','y =1.004, 0.34, and 6 =0.021.We chose
s0.72so that the steady state value of m would be equal to its sample average, 0.93.
Finally, (4.8) can be used to solve for d/j as a function of parameters whose values we have
already specified. This results in a value of d/ij equal to about 0.062.
5.2. Impulse Response Functions
Figure 2 displays the dynamic response functions of hours worked, investment, before and
after -taxreal wages, household transfers of consumption (Ct), as well as the marginal tax
rate to a fiscal policy shock. Notice that hours worked (nth) initially rises roughly 5% in
the impact period of the shock (time 0) and then declines, reaching itspre shock level after
about 3 quarters. Thereafter nh continues to fall, reaching a maximal decline of about 7%
around period 8, roughly the same time as the maximal rise in government purchases and
the marginal tax rate. So, as in the case of one sector model RBC analyzed inBEF, hours
worked decline when income tax rates and government purchases are high.'4 The behavior
of the before -taxreal wage mirrors the movements in nih, initially declining and then
rising above its pre shock level roughly 3 periods after the shock. In contrast the after -tax
real wage remains below its pre shock level for over twelve periods.Finally notice that the
response of investment is qualitatively very similar to that of nih, while C moves in the
opposite manner, falling when nh rises, and climbing when nh falls.
'4This result is reminiscent of the balanced budget case in Baxter andKing (1993).
12To see the intuition behind the forces at work in the model, note thatequations (4.3)
and (4.4), evaluated at equality, imply
C C+(l_y)wth_1Ji 51 CC+(l—y)sWh_W
It follows that, other things equal, the ratio of an employed worker'sconsumption to that of
a fired worker's consumption, (Ct/Cfl is a decreasing function of Ch.
Supposethat all taxes are lump-sum. Then (4.2) can be written as
=(rt — 6)K
—— (K+1—K). (5.2)
With this specification, increases in government purchases are financedby increases in t.
So,other things equal, an increase in G, causes C to fall and (Ct/Cfl to rise. But in
equilibrium (Ct/Cfl must be equal to the constant x So some other factor in (5.1) must
adjust. In equilibrium workers are indifferent between shirking and not shirking. Soa rise in
(Ct/Cfl would cause workers to strictly prefer not to shirk. In such a situation, firms could
cut real wages without inducing shirking behavior. Equations (4.6) and (5.1)can be used to
show that a decline in W, will move Ce/C back down towards its constant valuex The net
result then of a fiscal shock is a decline in the realwage and an increase in employment.'5
When the rise in government purchases is persistent there will bea significant rise in the
present value of the household's taxes. As in the neoclassical model, this rise induces the
household to increase investment. From (5.2) we see that a rise in (K+,—K)acts like a rise
in I. This reinforces the effects discussed above, exerting upwardpressure on employment
and downward pressure on real wages. For reference Figure 3presents the dynamic response
functions for the model economy under the assumption that the rise ingovernment purchases
induced by a fiscal policy shock is entirely financed by lumpsum taxes. Consistent with this
intuition we see from Figure 3 that in the lump sum taxcase, the fiscal policy shock leads to
a hump shaped, persistent rise in t,andinvestment, as well as a persistent, hump shaped
fall in before and after -taxreal wage rates.
To understand the impact of distortionary taxes on the model, recall that in theirpres-
ence, C is given by
=(1—Tt)(Tt — 6)K
—— (K+,—Kg).
A rise in thastwo effects: (i) it directly reduces C via the term (1 —)(Tt — 5)K, and (ii)
it indirectly affects C via its effect on K+, —K.The first effect acts much like the increase
in cI described above. Other things equal then, the rise in'rttendsto magnify the initial fall
"The rise in Titisdetermined by the firm's demand for labor.
13in real wages and the rise inThesecond effect works through the household's incentive to
invest in capital. Other things equal, a higher future value of 'rt reduces the time t return
to capital and the incentive to invest at time t. We refer to this as the one period ahead tax
effect. In addition there is an intertemporal effect associated with movements in 'rtwhich
induces the household to shift investment towards periods in which Ttisrelatively low.
Recall that according to our estimates, r,, responds in a hump shaped manner to a fiscal
period shock, rising by relatively small amounts in the first few periods. So the one period
ahead tax effect initially has a relatively small dampening effect on investment. But the
intertemporal tax effects are quite large. Agents have an incentive to invest to pay off
their higher tax bills and they may as well do so in periods in whichis relatively small.
Consistent with this, we see from Figures 2 and 3 that initially investment rises by more in
the distortionary tax case than in the lump sum tax case. Other things equal this means
that C falls by more and (Ct/Cfl rises by more in the distortionary tax case. So firms must
lower real wages by relatively more in the distortionary case to prevent shirking, which in
turn leads to relatively larger initial rises in t-
Asmarginal tax rates begin to rise significantly, the one period ahead tax effect becomes
quantitatively important. By period 3 investment falls to its pre shock level and continues
to fall, reaching a maximal decline of roughly 25% in period 8, the period in which Ttpeaks.
Other things equal the decline in investment causes C to rise and (Ct/Cfl to fall. To restore
(Ct/Cfl to its equilibrium value of x real wages rise which induces a fall in tThisexplains
the sharp decline in hours worked and investment after period 3 in Figure 3. It also accounts
for the fact that they are at their lowest levels when government purchases and taxes are at
their highest levels.
5.3.TestStatistics
We conclude this subsection by reporting the results of formally testing the models' ability
to account for various conditional moments of the data using the J statistic defined in (3.6).
We begin by discussing four moments pertaining to hours worked. The first two moments
relate to the maximal response of hours worked in the aftermath of a Ramey-Shapiro episode:
R1 (n) and R2 (ri) are the peak rise in nh and the average response of nh in periods 4 through
7 after a fiscal policy shock. The values of these moments for the model and the data, R(n)
and R (n), i =1,2, respectively, were calculated using estimates of the relevant dynamic
response functions. The third moment is the correlation between g and nih, p(g, rL), induced
by a fiscal policy shock. We let pm(g, ii)andpd(gn)denote the values of this moment implied
by the model and the data, respectively. The final moment, o, is the standard deviation
of hours worked induced by the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro shock. Below, a and a denote
14the values of this moment implied by the model and the data, respectively.'6
Column 1 of Table 1 reports the results of testing the individual hypotheses: R(n)—
R(n)0, i =1,2, pd(g, n) —pm(gn)0, and cr — 0.Note that we cannot reject
the hypothesis that R(n) —R(n)=0at conventional significance levels, nor can we reject
the hypothesis that a —= 0.However, while the model can match the overall volatility
of o and the peak response of nth it does so in away that is inconsistent with the timing of
the actual movements in nth. Consistent with our discussion above, the model predicts that
nth is strongly negatively correlated with gt with pm(g n) equal to —0.80. But in the data
gt and nh are strongly positively correlated, with d(g, n) =0.69.Not surprisingly, we can
reject the hypothesis that pd(g n) —pm(g,n) =0at the 1% significance level. Consistent
with the notion that model mispredicts the timing of theresponse of nth, we can also reject
the hypothesis that R(n) —R(n)=0.This reflects that the maximal response of nth in
the model occurs before period 4 while in the data they occur after period 4.
Column 2 of Table 1 provides the results of formally testing the analog hypotheses for real
wages. Specifically, the first two moments pertain to the maximal response of after-tax real
wages in the aftermath of a Ramey-Shapiro episode: R, [(1 —T)w]and R2 [(1 —r)w]denote
the maximal declines in (1 —Tt)wt and the average response of (1 —'Tt)Wt in periods 4through
7 after a fiscal policy shock. The third moment which we consider is the correlation between
gt and (1—t)wt,p[g, (1 —T)w],induced by a fiscal policy shock. The final moment,U(,r)w,
isthe standard deviation of the after-tax real wage induced by the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro
episode.
Notice that we cannot reject the hypotheses that the model accounts for the peak declines
in real wages and the conditional volatility in real wages. But as with nth, the model doesso
in a way that is inconsistent with the timing of the actual movements in'Wt.Inthe data after
-taxwages and government purchases are strongly negatively correlated with p [g, (1 —'r)w]
equal to —0.90. In the model these variables are less strongly correlated (—.32). As result
we can reject the hypothesis that the model can account for the correlation between after
-taxreal wages and government purchases at the 1% significance level. We can also easily
'6We calculated the last two moments as follows. Let the actual and model implieddynamic response
function of a variable Xttoa fiscal policy shock be given by H(L)D and H(L)D, respectively, Xt=
( 21/2
{nt,gt}.The value of a implied by the model and in the data is given by a =[H(i)]J
and
1/2 =
[H(i)]2},respectively.Here H(i) and H(i) denote the jth coefficient in the polynomial
lag operator H(L) and H(L). The value of p(g, nt) implied by the model and in the data is given by
pm(g, n) = H(i)H9(i)}/a7a and pd(g,71) = Hn(i)Hg(i)}/,respectively. Note that
the value of o in the model is equal to a by construction. In practice we calculatedo, a, pm(g, n),
pd(g ir)anda using the first 12 coefficients of the relevant dynamic response functions.
15reject the hypothesis that the average response of real wages during periods in 4 through 7
isthe same in the model and in the data.
6. Conclusion
This paper implements a particular limited information strategy for assessing the empirical
plausibility of competing business cycle models. The basic strategy is to confront models
with experiments that we claim to have isolated in the data and whose effects on the actual
economy we know. The experiment that we focus on is an exogenous fiscal shock that leads to
persistent movements in government purchases and average marginal tax rates. We analyzed
the ability of a particular general equilibrium efficiency wage model to account for the actual
responses of hours worked and of real wages to a fiscal policy shock. Our key finding is that
the model cannot do so unless we make the counterfactual assumption that marginal tax
rates are constant. This failure reflects, to a large extent, the response of investment to the
fiscal policy shock. We anticipate addressing this shortcoming in future work.
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Response of Model Economy to a Fiscal Shock
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